希臘歐盟彼此需要更多誠意

Maximum austerity and minimum reform have been the outcome of the Greek crisis so far. The fiscal and external adjustments have been painful. But the changes to a polity and economy riddled with clientelism and corruption have been modest. This is the worst of both worlds. The Greek people have suffered, but in vain. They are poorer than they thought they were. But a more productive Greece has failed to emerge. Now, after the election of the Syriza government, a forced Greek exit from the eurozone seems more likely than a productive new deal. But it is not too late. Everybody needs to take a deep breath.

迄今爲止，希臘危機只帶來了最大程度的緊縮和最小程度的改革。財政調整和外部調整令人痛苦。然而對充斥着裙帶關係和腐敗的政治體制和經濟的改革卻不痛不癢。兩方面都落得了最糟糕的結果。希臘人民深受其苦，卻徒勞無益。現在他們比他們過去認爲的更貧窮。希臘卻並未變得更有效率。現在，在希臘激進左翼聯盟(Syriza)政府上臺之後，希臘被迫退出歐元區似乎比達成富有成效的新協議更有可能發生。但現在還不晚。每個人都需要深吸一口氣。

The beginning of the new government has been predictably bumpy. Many of its domestic announcements indicate backsliding on reforms, notably over labour market reform and public-sector employment. Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, and Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister, have ruffled feathers in the way they have made their case for a new approach. Telling their partners that they would no longer deal with the “troika” — the group representing the European Commission, the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund — caused offence. It is also puzzling that the finance minister thought it wise to announce ideas for debt restructuring in London, the capital of a nation of bystanders.

可以預見，希臘新一屆政府的開端將是坎坷的。政府對內宣佈的許多事項，表明希臘的改革即將倒退，尤其是針對勞動力市場和公共部門就業的改革。希臘總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)和財長亞尼斯•瓦魯法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)對新策略的闡述已經引起了外界的憤怒。原因是，他們告訴夥伴國，希臘將不再與“三駕馬車”——歐盟委員會(European Commission)、歐洲央行(ECB)和國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)——協商。希臘財長認爲在慣於置身事外的英國的首都——倫敦宣佈債務重組方案是明智之舉，這也令人不解。

More significant, however, is whether Greece will run out of money soon. Most observers believe that Greece could find the 4.3bn it needs to pay the IMF next month even if the current programme were to lapse at the end of February. A more plausible danger is that Greek banks, vulnerable to runs by nervous depositors, would be deprived of access to funds from the European Central Bank. If that were to happen, the country would have to choose between constraining depositors’ access to their money and creating a new currency.

然而，更重要的是，希臘是否很快就會資金告罄。大多數觀察人士都相信，即使當前紓困計劃將在2月底到期，希臘下個月仍有能力拿出43億歐元償還給IMF。更有可能發生的危險是，希臘的銀行將被剝奪從歐洲央行獲取資金的資格，而它們很可能遭受不安儲戶的擠兌。如果真的發生這樣的事情，希臘只有兩個選擇，要麼是限制儲戶提款的權利，要麼是發行一種新的貨幣。

As Karl Whelan, Irish economist, notes, the ECB is not obliged to cut off the Greek banks. It has vast discretion over whether and how to offer support. The fundamental issue, he adds, is not whether Greek government securities are judged in default, since Greek banks do not rely heavily upon them.

正如愛爾蘭經濟學家卡爾•惠蘭(Karl Whelan)指出的，歐洲央行並非必須切斷希臘銀行的流動性。在是否援助和以何種方式援助方面，歐洲央行有極大的自由裁量權。他補充道，根本性問題不是希臘國債在違約時是否會受到審視，因爲希臘銀行對國債的依賴程度並不大。

Far more important are bonds the banks themselves issue, which are guaranteed by the Greek government. The ECB has stated it will no longer accept such bonds after the end of February, the date of expiry of the IMF programme. If the ECB were to stick to this, it would put pressure on the Greek government to sign a new deal. But this government might well refuse. In that case the ECB might cut off the Greek banks.

遠比上述問題更重要的是希臘的銀行發行的債券，這些債券由希臘政府擔保。歐洲央行已經聲明，2月底以後，也就是IMF紓困計劃到期以後，將不再接受這種債券。如果歐洲央行堅持這一立場，將向希臘政府施壓，迫使其簽訂一項新紓困協議。但這一屆政府可能加以拒絕。在這種情況下，歐洲央行可能切斷希臘銀行的流動性。

This game of chicken could drive the eurozone into an unnecessary crisis and Greece into meltdown before serious consideration of the alternatives. The government deserves the time to present its ideas for what it calls a new “contract” with its partners. Its partners surely despise and fear what Mr Tsipras stands for. But the EU is supposed to be a union of democracies, not an empire. The eurozone should negotiate in good faith.

在替代方案得到認真考慮之前，這場“懦夫博弈”就可能把歐元區拖入一場沒有必要的危機，並讓希臘陷入全面崩潰。應該給予希臘政府時間，讓其闡明關於與夥伴國簽訂新協議的想法。毫無疑問，希臘的夥伴國對齊普拉斯代表的理念心存輕蔑和恐懼。但歐盟(EU)應該是一個民主國家的聯盟，而不是一個帝國。歐元區應該誠心誠意地協商。

Moreover, the ideas presented on the debt are worth considering. Mr Varoufakis recognises that partner countries will not write down the face value of the debt owed to them, however absurd the pretence may be. So he proposes swaps, instead. A growth-linked bond (more precisely, one linked to nominal gross domestic product) would replace loans from the eurozone, while a perpetual loan would replace the ECB’s holdings of Greek bonds. One assumes the ECB would not accept the latter. But it might accept still longer-term bonds instead. GDP-linked bonds are an excellent idea, because they offer risk-sharing. A currency union that lacks a fiscal transfer mechanism needs a risk-sharing financial system. GDP-linked bonds would be a good step in that direction.

此外，希臘提出的債務解決方案值得考慮。瓦魯法基斯承認，夥伴國將不會減記希臘欠他們的債務的面值，不論藉口多麼不合理。所以，他轉而提出債務置換。一種與經濟增長掛鉤（更準確地說，是與名義國內生產總值(GDP)掛鉤）的債券將取代來自歐元區的貸款，同時，一種永久債券將取代歐洲央行持有的希臘債券。人們認爲歐洲央行不會接受後者。但它可能會接受長期債券。與GDP掛鉤的債券是一個極好的主意，因爲它們提供了風險共擔。缺乏財政轉移機制的貨幣聯盟需要一個風險共擔的金融體系。與GDP掛鉤的債券將是朝這個方向邁出的令人滿意的一步。

Many governments would oppose anything that looks like a sellout to extremists. The Spanish government is strongly opposed to legitimising the campaign of its new opposition party, Podemos, against austerity. Nevertheless, Greece and Spain are very different. Spain is not on a programme and owes much of its debt to its own people. It can justify much of its policy mix in its own terms, without having to oppose a new agreement for Greece.

許多政府會反對任何看起來像是在向極端分子屈服的事。西班牙政府強烈反對將該國新的反對黨——社會民主力量黨(Podemos)的反緊縮運動合法化。然而，希臘和西班牙有很大區別。西班牙現在並沒有接受紓困，而且其多數債務都是欠本國國民的。它可以證明其政策組合對於自身的合理性，而不必反對一項希臘的新協議。

Two crucial issues remain. The first is the size of the primary fiscal surplus, now supposed to be 4.5 per cent of GDP. The government proposes 1.0 to 1.5 per cent, instead. Given the depressed state of the Greek economy, this makes sense. But it also means Greece would pay trivial amounts of interest in the near term.

兩個至關重要的問題仍在存在。第一個是基本財政盈餘的規模，現在普遍認爲應該是GDP的4.5%。而希臘政府提出的是GDP的1.0%至1.5%。考慮到希臘經濟的低迷狀態，這有合理之處。但這也意味着希臘短期內只會支付極少數額的利息。

The second issue is structural reform. The IMF notes that the past government failed to deliver on 13 of the 14 reforms to which it was supposedly committed. Yet the need for radical reform of the state and private sector no doubt exists.

第二個問題是結構性改革。IMF指出，希臘上屆政府未能兌現其本已承諾的14項改革中的13項。然而，毫無疑問，希臘依然需要對國有以及私營部門進行徹底的改革。

One indication of the abiding economic inefficiency is the failure of exports to grow in real terms, despite the depression.

經濟效率持續低下的一個體現是，儘管經濟不景氣，實際出口仍未實現增長。

Indeed, Greece faces far more than a challenge to reform. It has to achieve law-governed modernity. It is on these issues that negotiations must focus.

實際上，希臘改革還面臨更多的挑戰。它必須實現實行法治的現代化。與希臘的談判必須聚焦這些問題。

So this must be the deal: deep and radical reform in return for an escape from debt-bondage.

所以這場交易應該是這樣的：希臘用深層次、徹底的改革換取債務束縛的解除。

This new deal does not need to be reached this month. The Greeks are right to ask for time. But, in the end, they need to convince their partners they are serious about reforms.

這份新協議不需要在本月達成。希臘人要求更多的時間是正確的。但最終，他們需要讓夥伴國相信他們對待改革是認真的。

What if it becomes obvious that they cannot or will not do so? The currency union is a partnership of states, not a federal union. Such a partnership can only work if it is a community of values. If Greece wants to be something quite different, that is its right. But it should leave. Yes, the damage would be considerable and the result undesirable. But an open sore would be worse.

但如果他們不能或不願這樣做，而且這種跡象變得越來越明顯，那該怎麼辦？貨幣聯盟是一種國家間的夥伴關係，而非一個聯邦同盟。這種夥伴關係只有在其自身是一個價值觀共同體時纔會發揮作用。如果希臘想成爲一個另類，這是它的權利，但它應該離開。當然，破壞將會非常巨大，結果也不是人們想要的。但開放的傷口會更糟糕。

So calm down and talk. Let us all then see whether the talk can become action.

所以，大家冷靜下來，好好談一談。至於談判能否變成行動，讓我們拭目以待。