經濟陰霾不散 希臘違約的後果

What is going to happen with Greece? Nobody knows. That does not mean nobody cares. On the contrary people care passionately, in directly conflicting directions. On both sides are participants determined not to concede. This impasse illustrates the folly of creating a currency union among sovereign states that lack common political institutions, powerful emotional bonds or strong economic similarities. The marriage is ghastly but divorce is scary.

希臘將會發生什麼？沒有人知道，不過這並不意味着沒人關心。相反，有着直接利害衝突的兩方都非常關注希臘，而兩方都堅決不妥協。這種僵局充分展示了，在缺乏共同政治體制、強烈情感紐帶或者高度經濟相似性的主權國家中創建一個貨幣聯盟是多麼愚蠢。合則不快，分又可怕。

Greece is now on the brink of default. It owes 1.5bn to the International Monetary Fund this month; another 452m to the IMF and 3.5bn to the European Central Bank next month; and a further 176m to the IMF and 3.2bn to the ECB in August. Without a deal with the rest of the eurozone to release 7.2bn in the remaining funds from its bailout agreement, Athens will be forced to default. It has no other source of money. Its access to markets is closed. (See chart.)

希臘現在處於違約的邊緣。希臘本月應還國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)15億歐元，下月要還國際貨幣基金組織4.52億歐元、還歐洲央行(ECB)35億歐元，今年8月還要還國際貨幣基金組織1.76億歐元、歐洲央行32億歐元。如果無法與其他歐元區國家就紓困協議中72億歐元剩餘紓困資金的發放達成協議，希臘政府將被迫違約。它沒有其他資金來源，而且也無法進入市場融資。

If a deal with the eurozone is not reached, Greece will default. The ECB would then reconsider the acceptability of claims on the government (be they direct liabilities or guarantees) as collateral for its lending to banks. Haircuts would certainly be raised sharply. The ECB would find it particularly hard to lend against collateral supplied by a government that has defaulted to itself. The knowledge that default is imminent has already accelerated a run on the Greek banks. Without a deal, therefore, banks will soon be forced to halt withdrawals.

如果無法與歐元區達成協議，希臘將會違約。屆時歐洲央行將會重新考慮是否接受對希臘政府的索償權（無論是政府的直接債務還是擔保），作爲向銀行提供貸款的擔保品。減記幅度肯定會大大提高。歐洲央行將會發現，很難接受一個對歐洲央行本身違約的政府提供的擔保品，來發放貸款。人們明白希臘即將違約，這已經加快了對希臘銀行的擠提。因此，如果沒有達成協議，銀行將很快被迫暫停提款。

The mood music coming from those engaged in these discussions is highly discordant. Alexis Tsipras, Greek prime minister, has accused bailout monitors of making “absurd” demands. On the other side are those equally determined not to grant concessions, foremost among them governments of member countries that have stuck to harsh commitments or are poorer than Greece. Meanwhile on the sidelines Jack Lew, US Treasury secretary, is reduced to pleading for flexibility, terrified of the consequences of another upset.

參與談判人士發出的聲音分歧極大。希臘總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)指責紓困監督人提出了“荒謬的”要求。另一邊同樣決定毫不妥協，尤其是那些堅持嚴苛承諾或者比希臘更爲貧窮的歐元區成員國政府。與此同時，由於擔心又一次談判失敗的後果，一旁旁觀的美國財政部長傑克•盧(Jack Lew)不得不懇請雙方拿出靈活態度。

It is not hard to see why it has proved so hard to reach a deal. As Goldman Sachs notes[no LINK available], the European authorities are negotiating on the basis of three principles: first, staying in the euro requires further economic adjustment by Greece; second, additional support must be conditional; third, external oversight is required to ensure compliance with those conditions. Yet the Greek government was elected on a promise to stay in the eurozone but without austerity, adjustment or external oversight. These positions are irreconcilable. Either one side gives in or Greece defaults. If Greece defaults, it will have a second round of decisions to make: namely whether to try to remain inside the eurozone, even without normally functioning banks.

不難理解爲何達成協議如此艱難。正如高盛(Goldman Sachs)指出的那樣，歐洲有關當局基於3項原則進行談判：第一，要留在歐元區，希臘就得進一步實施經濟改革；第二，額外支持必須附加條件；第三，必須實施外部監督來確保希臘遵守這些條件。然而，這屆希臘政府之所以當選，是因爲它承諾留在歐元區，但不會實施緊縮和調整措施或者接受外部監督。這些立場是不可調和的。要麼有一方讓步，要麼希臘違約。如果希臘違約，它將需要做出第二輪決定，即是否還要努力留在歐元區內，即便沒有正常運營的銀行。

Reaching a deal is not in principle inconceivable. While the eurozone will insist on monitored conditions, it has some flexibility on which conditions to insist upon. But Greece is viewed as a serial backslider. Some — the government of Spain, for example — are terrified that concessions would strengthen the credibility of domestic radicals. Thus, trust and tolerance are both exhausted. Meanwhile, the present Greek government might have to collapse and another one be formed before the country can make concessions.

原則上來說，達成協議並非不可想象。儘管歐元區將會堅持對希臘遵守條件的情況加以監督，但對於堅持哪些條件它也有一定的靈活度。但人們認爲希臘積習難改。有些國家（比如西班牙政府）擔心，如果做出讓步，將會增強希臘國內激進人士的可信度。因此，信任和忍耐都已消耗殆盡。與此同時，要想讓希臘做出讓步，恐怕得現任希臘政府下臺，換一屆政府才行。

So what might happen next? On the assumption that a deal cannot be agreed before midnight, so to speak, the Greek government will default, at least technically, and so the liquidity squeeze on the economy (and the recession) will intensify. The fiscal situation — already weakened by spending commitments, falling revenue and a weakening economy — would deteriorate further. This year, the primary fiscal balance (before interest) might be a deficit of about 1 per cent of gross domestic product, worse than the IMF forecast in April[NO LINK AVAILABLE].

那麼接下來會發生什麼？可以這麼說，假如在午夜前無法達成協議，至少從技術角度而言，希臘政府將會違約，從而加劇該國經濟的流動性緊張（以及衰退）。已經由於支出承諾、收入下降和經濟疲弱而被削弱的希臘財政狀況，將會進一步惡化。今年，希臘基本財政赤字（不計利息支出）可能爲國內生產總值(GDP)的1%左右，比IMF今年4月預期的還要糟糕。

An important question is how to sustain the economy until either new agreements are reached or the Greeks abandon the euro. Adam Lerrick of the American Enterprise Institute suggests how liquidity might be sustained even if the banks were closed. Under his scheme, people would be able to use claims on deposits, to be called “deposit receipts”, in place of the euro notes and coins they would no longer be able to obtain from their bank. This would sustain spending in such a cash-dependent economy. These depositary receipts would be established as legal tender. Within Greece, therefore, these depositary receipts would be money.

一個重要的問題是，如何維持經濟直至達成新的協議，或者直至希臘拋棄歐元。美國企業研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的亞當•萊裏克(Adam Lerrick)提出了即便銀行關門也能維持流動性的辦法。按照他的計劃，人們將能夠使用被稱爲“存款憑證”的票據來取代他們不再能夠從銀行獲得的歐元紙幣和硬幣。這將在一個極度依賴現金的經濟中維持支出。這些存款憑證將被確定爲法定貨幣，因此在希臘內部，這些存款憑證就是錢。

Under this proposal there would be a limit on issuance, since receipts would be backed by existing deposits, one for one. Greeks would still have to make external payments in euros. The value of depositary receipts — a sort of Greek euro — would float against the euro as the demand for the latter rose and fell.

按照這種提議，發行存款憑證將會存在限制，因爲這些憑證將由現有存款一對一地支持。希臘仍將必須使用歐元進行外部支付。存款憑證（算是某種希臘歐元）兌歐元的價值將隨着歐元需求的升降而浮動。

Such a scheme could cushion the Greek economy against a total collapse. It could also be a precursor to full exit, should a workable deal not be reached. Given the current political impasse, such an expedient may soon be needed.

此類計劃可能讓希臘經濟免於全面崩潰。如果未能達成一項可行協議，該計劃也可以爲希臘全面退出歐元區做好準備。鑑於當前的政治僵局，希臘可能很快需要此類權宜之計。

It has long been my view that if a deal can be reached at all, it will take time. It will also require big concessions on both sides. But I believe that a deal should in principle be possible. It is also hard to exaggerate the significance of an exit — even of a country as small and annoying as Greece — for the euro project (however misguided) and so post-second world-war European integration. Once the euro is seen to be reversible, the economic forces driving integration reverse. Every crisis will become potentially lethal. The efforts of the ECB to eliminate exit risk will have been almost for nought.

我一直認爲，如果真的能達成協議的話，也將需要時間。它還需要雙方都做出重大讓步。但我認爲，原則上講達成協議應該還是有可能的。即便是像希臘這樣令人惱火的小國家，它的退出對歐元計劃（無論它多麼錯誤）的影響也很難誇大，二戰後的歐洲一體化計劃同樣如此。一旦歐元被視爲是可逆的，推動歐洲一體化的經濟力量就會逆轉。每一場危機都可能是致命的。歐洲央行消除退出風險的努力將幾乎是竹籃打水。

This must be seen as a long game. All involved made mountainous mistakes in the run-up to the Greek crisis and again since then. To fail now would be to pile a new mountain of error on the old ones. They need instead to recognise and learn from those past blunders.

人們必須認識到這是一場持久戰。所有相關方都在希臘危機前夕犯了大錯，而且自那以來繼續犯錯。現在無法達成協議將是錯上加錯。他們有必要認識到過去的錯誤並從中汲取教訓。