美國須檢討 亞投行教訓

This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system. True, there have been any number of periods of frustration for the US before, and times when American behaviour was hardly multilateralist, such as the 1971 Nixon shock, ending the convertibility of the dollar into gold. But I can think of no event since Bretton Woods comparable to the combination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution and the failure of the US to persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting with Britain, to stay out of it.

剛剛過去的這個月可能會作爲一個歷史性時刻載入史冊，它標誌着美國失去了全球經濟體系擔保人的角色。誠然，美國以前經歷過數段挫折期，很多時候它的行爲也算不上多邊主義，比如1971年結束了美元兌換黃金的尼克松衝擊(Nixon shock)。但除佈雷頓森林體系(Bretton Woods)以外，我想不到有任何事件可與以下兩件事的結合相提並論：中國力求建立一個重要的新機構；而從英國開始，美國未能說服幾十個傳統盟友不要參與該機構。

This failure of strategy and tactics was a long time coming, and it should lead to a comprehensive review of the US approach to global economics. With China’s economic size rivalling America’s and emerging markets accounting for at least half of world output, the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment. Political pressures from all sides in the US have rendered it increasingly dysfunctional.

這是一場早有預兆的戰略和戰術上的失敗，它應該引來一場有關美國對全球經濟採取什麼姿態的全面檢討。隨着中國的經濟規模趕上美國，以及新興市場在全球產出總量中至少佔一半份額，全球經濟架構需作出大幅調整。而國內各方的政治壓力使美國的行爲變得越來越不正常。

Largely because of resistance from the right, the US stands alone in the world in failing to approve the International Monetary Fund governance reforms that Washington itself pushed for in 2009. By supplementing IMF resources, this change would have bolstered confidence in the global economy. More important, it would come closer to giving countries such as China and India a share of IMF votes commensurate with their new economic heft.

美國政府在2009年推動國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)進行治理改革，但主要由於右翼的阻撓，美國未能批准改革方案，令其在國際社會陷入孤立。該改革方案本可以通過補充IMF的資源，提振全球經濟信心。更重要的是，它可以賦予中國和印度等國與其新的經濟份量更加相稱的投票權份額。

Meanwhile, pressures from the left have led to pervasive restrictions on infrastructure projects financed through existing development banks, which consequently have receded as funders, even as many developing countries now see infrastructure finance as their principal external funding need.

與此同時，美國國內左翼的壓力導致基礎設施項目在通過現有開發銀行融資時處處受限，這些開發銀行作爲出資者已逐漸退縮，儘管許多發展中國家現在將基礎設施融資視爲它們主要的外部融資需求。

With US commitments unhonoured and US-backed policies blocking the kinds of finance other countries want to provide or receive through the existing institutions, the way was clear for China to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. There is room for argument about the tactical approach that should have been taken once the initiative was put forward. But the larger question now is one of strategy. Here are three precepts that US leaders should keep in mind.

鑑於美國不能兌現承諾，而且美國支持的政策阻止其他國家通過現有機構提供或接受資助，中國建立亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡稱亞投行）的道路是暢通的。在這個倡議提出後，對於在戰術上應該採取什麼樣的姿態是存在爭論空間的。但現在更大的問題是戰略問題。美國領導人應牢記以下三條準則。

First, American leadership must have a bipartisan foundation at home, be free from gross hypocrisy and be restrained in the pursuit of self-interest. As long as one of our major parties is opposed to essentially all trade agreements, and the other is resistant to funding international organisations, the US will not be in a position to shape the global economic system.

首先，美國的領導力必須在國內有兩黨的基礎，摒棄嚴重虛僞，並收斂對自身利益的追求。只要我們的兩個主要政黨仍然一個基本上反對所有貿易協定，另一個不願資助國際組織，美國就無法影響全球經濟體系的格局。

Other countries are legitimately frustrated when US officials ask them to adjust their policies — then insist that American state regulators, independent agencies and far-reaching judicial actions are beyond their control. This is especially true when many foreign businesses assert that US actions raise real rule of law problems.

每當美國官員要求其他國家調整政策，然後堅稱自己無法控制美國各州監管機構、獨立機構以及影響深遠的司法行動時，其他國家有充分理由感到鬱悶，尤其是在許多外國企業宣稱美國的舉動引發實質性法治問題的情況下。

The legitimacy of US leadership depends on our resisting the temptation to abuse it in pursuit of parochial interest, even when that interest appears compelling. We cannot expect to maintain the dollar’s primary role in the international system if we are too aggressive about limiting its use in pursuit of particular security objectives.

美國領導力的合法性取決於我們能否抵擋住誘惑，不利用它追求美國一國之利，即便這種利益看上去非常具有吸引力。如果我們將美元的使用侷限於追求某些特定的安全目標，在這方面過於咄咄逼人，我們就不能指望能維持美元在國際體系中至高無上的地位。

Second, in global as well as domestic politics, the middle class counts the most. It sometimes seems that the prevailing global agenda combines elite concerns about matters such as intellectual property, investment protection and regulatory harmonisation with moral concerns about global poverty and posterity, while offering little to those in the middle. Approaches that do not serve the working class in industrial countries (and rising urban populations in developing ones) are unlikely to work out well in the long run.

其次，在國際以及國內政治中，中產階級都應該是擺在第一位的。有時候，主流國際議程一方面是精英們關心的問題，如知識產權、投資保護和監管協調，另一方面是有關全球貧困和子孫後代的道德擔憂，但很少關心中產階級。不爲工業化國家裏的勞動者階級（以及發展中國家不斷壯大的城市人口）謀福利的政策，從長遠來看不太可能成功。

Third, we may be headed into a world where capital is abundant and deflationary pressures are substantial. Demand could be in short supply for some time. In no big industrialised country do markets expect real interest rates to be much above zero in 2020 or inflation targets to be achieved. In the future, the priority must be promoting investment, not imposing austerity. The present system places the onus of adjustment on “borrowing” countries. The world now requires a symmetric system, with pressure also placed on “surplus” countries.

第三，我們的世界或許在朝這樣的方向前進：資本充足，通縮壓力巨大。需求不足的問題可能會持續一段時間。在所有大型工業化國家，市場都不指望2020年的實際利率會比零高出太多，也不指望通脹目標能夠實現。未來的重心必須是促進投資，而非實施緊縮政策。現行體制將調整的責任放在了“借款”國身上。如今世界需要一種對稱的體制，讓“盈餘”國也承擔起責任。

These precepts are just a beginning, and many questions remain. There are questions about global public goods, about acting with the speed and clarity that the current era requires, about co-operation between governmental and non-governmental actors, and much more. What is crucial is that the events of the past month will be seen by future historians not as the end of an era, but as a salutary wake up call.

上述原則只是個開始，還存在許多問題。有全球公共品問題，有在採取行動時拿出當今時代所要求的速度和清晰度的問題，有政府和非政府行爲主體之間合作的問題，等等。重要的是，過去一個月的事件將被未來的史學家視爲一記及時的警鐘，而非一個時代終結的標誌。

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

注：本文作者是美國哈佛大學(Harvard)查爾斯•W•艾略特校級教授(Charles W. Eliot University Professor)，曾擔任美國財政部長。